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Involuntary images and visual memories are prominent in many types of psychopathology. Patients with
posttraumatic stress disorder, other anxiety disorders, depression, eating disorders, and psychosis fre-
quently report repeated visual intrusions corresponding to a small number of real or imaginary events,
usually extremely vivid, detailed, and with highly distressing content. Both memory and imagery appear
to rely on common networks involving medial prefrontal regions, posterior regions in the medial and
lateral parietal cortices, the lateral temporal cortex, and the medial temporal lobe. Evidence from
cognitive psychology and neuroscience implies distinct neural bases to abstract, flexible, contextualized
representations (C-reps) and to inflexible, sensory-bound representations (S-reps). We revise our previ-
ous dual representation theory of posttraumatic stress disorder to place it within a neural systems model
of healthy memory and imagery. The revised model is used to explain how the different types of
distressing visual intrusions associated with clinical disorders arise, in terms of the need for correct
interaction between the neural systems supporting S-reps and C-reps via visuospatial working memory.
Finally, we discuss the treatment implications of the new model and relate it to existing forms of
psychological therapy.
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Recurrent and intrusive images feature in the diagnostic criteria
for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), acute stress disorder, and
obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) but are not mentioned in
relation to the majority of other mental disorders (American Psy-
chiatric Association, 2000). Consistent with this, psychological
theories of mental disorders have given much more attention to the
role of various kinds of negative verbal thought than to the role of
visual intrusions (Brewin, 1998; Hackmann & Holmes, 2004). In
contrast, there is increasing empirical research suggesting that
intrusive visual images and memories are a common feature of
many disorders (i.e., a transdiagnostic process; A. G. Harvey,
Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004; Hirsch & Holmes, 2007). In
this article we relate observations of intrusive memories and im-
ages across a variety of disorders to models of memory and
imagery drawn from cognitive psychology and cognitive neuro-
science. This material is then used to update and expand the dual
representation theory of PTSD (Brewin, 2001, 2003) by placing it
within the context of a neurobiological model of normal memory
and imagery (Burgess, Becker, King, & O’Keefe, 2001; Byrne,
Becker, & Burgess, 2007). Finally, we consider the implications
for psychological treatment.
Intrusions are instances of involuntary or direct, as opposed to
voluntary, retrieval in that their appearance in consciousness is
spontaneous rather than following a deliberate effort or search
(Berntsen, 2009; Mace, 2007). The vast majority of psychological
research on memory and imagery has involved voluntary, effortful
processes to the neglect of involuntary ones. Although involuntary
remembering appears to be a common, everyday phenomenon
(Berntsen, 2007), little is known about other types of intrusive
imagery. Much of what is known comes from observations of
individuals with psychological disorders, which suggest that visual
intrusions tend to be repetitive, uncontrollable, and distressing.
Experimental research indicates that imagery may elicit stronger
emotional responses than do corresponding verbal cognitions
(Holmes & Mathews, 2005; Holmes, Mathews, Mackintosh, &
Dalgleish, 2008), which makes these intrusions of particular the-
oretical and clinical interest. Consistent with this, the importance
of intrusive imagery in understanding emotional distress has peri-
odically been noted (e.g., Beck, 1970; Horowitz, 1970; Lang,
1977), particularly in theoretical writing on the anxiety disorders
(e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995; Salkovskis, 1985), and images have
occasionally featured as therapeutic targets in their own right (e.g.,
Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Edwards, 2007; Hackmann,
1998).
In the clinical domain, theorizing about visual intrusions has
largely been restricted to PTSD. Most theories have in common the
idea that a disturbance in memory is a central component of the
disorder and have identified the existence of decrements in volun-
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zzzPsgiolePfrptary trauma memory that coexist with enhanced involuntary mem-
ory for the trauma (see Brewin & Holmes, 2003, and Brewin,
2007, for reviews). Some influential clinical theories have there-
fore augmented a standard autobiographical memory model by
proposing a role for a second memory system that processes lower
level, sensory information (see, for example, Brewin, Dalgleish, &
Joseph, 1996) or for increased stimulus priming (Ehlers & Clark,
2000). In contrast, models of trauma memory put forward by
cognitive psychologists tend to be single-system accounts in which
traumatic memory is essentially similar to normal memory in
being the product of a high-level constructive process associated
with activity in the medial temporal lobes (MTLs; see, e.g., Rubin,
Berntsen, & Bohni, 2008, with ensuing commentaries from Mon-
roe & Mineka, 2008, and Berntsen, Rubin, & Bohni, 2008).
The fact that intrusions are not restricted to PTSD suggests that
there could be important lessons from studying their role in other
psychological disorders, and this material is reviewed at the be-
ginning of this article. The conclusions are then integrated into a
revised and expanded version of the dual representation theory of
PTSD (Brewin, 2001, 2003; Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996)
that draws on recent developments in understanding the neural
mechanisms of memory and imagery (Byrne et al., 2007). The
revised model attempts to be more comprehensive by (a) encom-
passing both intrusive memories and images, (b) grounding clin-
ical observations in specific brain pathways and processes, and (c)
considering an increased range of psychological disorders.
Intrusive Images and Memories
Definitions and Characteristics
Images can be defined as “contents of consciousness that pos-
sess sensory qualities as opposed to those that are purely verbal or
abstract” (Hackmann, 1998, p. 301) and can occur in many dif-
ferent forms, such as dreams, nightmares, and pleasant fantasies
(Horowitz, 1967). They can possess various sensory qualities—
including visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, touch, and move-
ment (Kosslyn, 1994)—and can be described in terms of their
content, vividness, clarity, color, shading, shapes, movement, fore-
ground and background characteristics, and other spatial relation-
ships (Horowitz, 1970). Furthermore, Horowitz (1970) stated that
“a person can often tell how the image entered awareness, its
duration, associated emotions, the relationship of the emotion to
the external world, efforts to change or dispel it, and the sequential
or simultaneous arrangement of a series of images” (p. 3). Al-
though images can involve all the senses, the vast majority of the
literature is concerned with visual images, and this is the focus of
the current article.
Images are experienced “on a continuum from the near veridical
reconstruction in the mind of a real event to the construction of an
entirely hypothetical situation” (Martin & Williams, 1990, p. 268).
Theories of autobiographical memory in particular emphasize the
central role played by sensory images, which provide context and
detail during the recollective process (e.g., Conway 2001). Many
clinical investigations of naturally occurring imagery have not
distinguished images based on fantasy from visual autobiograph-
ical memories. Others have classified imagery reports as either
detailed autobiographical memories or other kinds of images.
“Other” images would include, for example, a detail from a mem-
ory devoid of any surrounding context (e.g., the disembodied face
of an attacker) or a hypothetical situation that had never happened
(see, e.g., Patel et al., 2007, for further discussion).
From a clinical perspective, vividness is an important quality of
imagery. Reliving is a general property of autobiographical mem-
ory, although one that can vary considerably in degree, and cor-
responds to Tulving’s (1985) idea of autonoetic consciousness,a
particularly vivid form of imagery. Descriptions of PTSD empha-
size the importance of flashbacks—powerful memories in which
traumatic events are not just relived but reexperienced as occurring
in the present (Brewin, 2003; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Ehlers, Hack-
mann, & Michael, 2004). Flashbacks are considered to involve
dissociative distortions to the perception of time, place, and the
self and can vary from relatively mild (there is a transient sense of
the event reoccurring in the present) to severe (the person loses all
connection with his or her current autobiographical self and
present surroundings while reexperiencing the memory). These
features appear to be related to the presence of PTSD rather than
to be general characteristics of trauma memories (Brewin, 2007).
Where traumatic events are concerned, vulnerability to flash-
backs may relate to dissociative responses at the time of the trauma
in which the person experienced an altered sense of time passing,
a loss of emotional responsivity, or an out-of-body experience
(observing events as they happen from an external perspective, for
example as though looking down from the ceiling). It has been
variously argued that these dissociative reactions may correspond
to a biologically hard-wired freezing response (Nijenhuis, Vander-
linden, & Spinhoven, 1998) or to a defensive strategy for reducing
the emotional and physiological impact of the event (van der Kolk,
van der Hart, & Marmar, 1996).
There is a well-known and related memory alteration that does
not imply any dissociative process but has also been argued to
serve the function of reducing unwanted emotional arousal. This
involves seeing oneself from an observer perspective rather than
recalling an event from one’s original point of view (field perspec-
tive). Freud (1953) is one of many to have noted this process, but
it has since been extensively researched (Rubin et al., 2008). Nigro
and Neisser (1983) reported that when participants were asked to
generate autobiographical memories, those seen from a field per-
spective tended to be more recent, whereas those seen from an
observer perspective tended to be characterized by situations in-
volving high self-awareness (e.g., self-consciousness induced by
having to speak in public). In another experiment, Nigro and
Neisser asked participants to recall autobiographical events and
focus on either their feelings or the objective circumstances. The
former instruction produced more field memories, and the latter
more observer memories. The evidence reviewed below indicates
that, like dissociative reactions, observer memories may occur
involuntarily as well as voluntarily.
Methodology of Assessment
A semistructured interview is the main methodology used to
investigate the phenomenology of intrusive images. Following
Beck, Laude, and Bohnert (1974), in most investigations research-
ers have asked participants to report the images that come to mind
when they are feeling anxious and to focus on a typical image and
describe what they could see, hear, smell, taste, and feel in their
body. Some investigators have asked the participants about their
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and its meaning in terms of themselves, other people, and the
world. Finally, some have asked the participants about their ear-
liest recollection of an incident involving the same images, sensa-
tions, and feelings (see, e.g., Hackmann, Clark, & McManus,
2000; Wells & Hackmann, 1993). Often the frequency of intru-
sions, their duration and vividness, the extent of reliving them, and
any accompanying emotions would also be recorded.
Slightly different procedures have been adopted for different
clinical populations. In studies of depression, participants have
mainly been asked to report any recurrent visual memories of
stressful autobiographical events that occurred during a specified
time period, usually the past week (see, e.g., Brewin, Hunter,
Carroll, & Tata, 1996). In most PTSD research, participants are
specifically asked to report upon trauma-related memories, without
necessarily being restricted to a specific time frame (see, e.g.,
Hackmann, Ehlers, Speckens, & Clark, 2004). In other clinical
domains, the interview mainly varies in terms of the situation that
people are orientated toward and may start with an exercise to
familiarize participants with discussing imagery (Day, Holmes, &
Hackmann, 2004). For example, in a study of OCD, participants
were asked to think about a time when their symptoms were severe
(Speckens, Hackmann, Ehlers, & Cuthbert, 2007); in a study of
eating disorders, a time when they worried about their eating,
weight, or shape (Somerville, Cooper, & Hackmann, 2007); and in
a study of body dysmorphic disorder, a time when they worried
about their appearance (Osman, Cooper, Hackmann, & Veale,
2004).
In common with related research in cognitive psychology, de-
tailed phenomenological investigations such as these have gener-
ally sidestepped issues of validity, because no independent sources
of validation are readily available. The emphasis has been more on
covering multiple dimensions, even if single-item measures are the
only ones practical, than on restricting the range of inquiry but
using more reliable methods. As a result, we know little about how
accurately these interview questions assess and discriminate the
different dimensions of experience. Also lacking is information
about test–retest reliability and about the internal and external
conditions that may affect intrusion reports. As interest in intru-
sions becomes more widespread, it will be important to pay more
attention to the measurement issues that have hitherto been largely
neglected.
Naturalistic Studies of Intrusive Images and
Memories in Psychological Disorders
Articles that provide systematic empirical data on the phenom-
enology of intrusive visual memories or images in samples meet-
ing diagnostic criteria for a psychological disorder are presented in
Table 1. The studies describe intrusions experienced under normal
rather than experimental conditions. The table identifies studies
that recorded any image, whether reality- or fantasy-based, and
those that distinguished visual autobiographical memories from
other images. The table also gives details of the samples studied:
whether the focus was on intrusive images or memories, the
prevalence of the phenomenon, and the typical number of images
or memories that were reported to intrude. In the following sec-
tions we describe the content of the intrusions, their qualities
(including sensory aspects, reliving, and observer/field perspec-
tive), associations with other variables, and their relation to the
course of disorder or to treatment for each of a number of separate
disorders.
Anxiety Neurosis and Panic Disorder
The first systematic study of intrusive imagery was conducted
by Beck et al. (1974, Study 2). Prefiguring later findings, they
reported that 90% of their sample of patients with anxiety neurosis
(a variety of mixed anxiety disorders) had intrusive images that,
like the patients’ intrusive thoughts, concerned situations involving
harm or danger. Other early studies were conducted with samples
largely consisting of panic patients. Although rates of intrusive
images were low in the studies by Hibbert (1984) and Breitholtz,
Westling, and Öst (1998), this may have been because the inter-
view was centered mainly on verbal cognition and was limited to
the previous 3 weeks. Studies reporting higher rates of intrusive
images typically asked respondents to think about times when they
felt anxious or panicky (e.g., Ottaviani & Beck, 1987). There was
agreement between studies that images were generally concerned
with mental or physical catastrophe.
Health-Related Anxiety
Wells and Hackmann (1993) found that the imagery of patients
with health anxiety tended to depict physical catastrophe while
also reflecting negative beliefs about both the self and the nature of
health and illness. This was the first study of recurrent imagery to
note that the content of the images often connected to an earlier
aversive experience and contained recognizable elements that were
transformed in the image. For example, one patient had an image
of himself as dead but trapped in a magic barrel that did not allow
him to move or escape. He associated the image with seeing
funerals as a young boy, when he had not understood that the
people being buried were dead but had thought they were being
buried alive as a punishment.
More recently, Whitaker, Brewin, and Watson (2008) compared
rates of intrusive images and memories in matched groups of
anxious and nonanxious men with prostate cancer. Levels of
anxiety were lower than in other studies conducted with psychi-
atric patients, and perhaps as a result, the number of intrusions was
lower. Nevertheless, the frequency of both images and memories
was linearly related to anxiety. Intrusions were associated with
poorer coping even after levels of anxiety were statistically con-
trolled. Whitaker, Watson, and Brewin (2009) reported that in a
mixed group of cancer patients, visual intrusions were significantly
more distressing than were verbal intrusions.
Depression
Spenceley and Jerrom (1997); Reynolds and Brewin (1998); and
Brewin, Watson, McCarthy, Hyman, and Dayson (1998a) have
compared depressed and nondepressed samples, confirming that
there are significantly higher levels of intrusion and avoidance of
memories in the clinical groups. In the first study of its kind
Kuyken and Brewin (1994) found that many depressed female
inpatients reported memories involving childhood physical or sex-
ual abuse. These findings were replicated by Brewin, Hunter, et al.
(1996), who carried out a similar study with a mixed-gender
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zzzPsgiolePfrpsample of depressed patients, asking them about memories linked
to a variety of life events. Most memories could be classified in
one of three categories—illness and death, relationship and family
problems, or abuse and assault—a finding that has since been
repeated a number of times (see, e.g., Patel et al., 2007; Reynolds
& Brewin, 1999). Like Wells and Hackmann (1993), Brewin,
Hunter, et al. (1996) found that intrusions frequently involved
events dating from many years prior to the onset of symptoms.
Intrusive memories are often triggered by rumination (Birrer,
Michael, & Munsch, 2007) and can be embedded within longer
ruminative sequences (Pearson, Brewin, Rhodes, & McCarron,
2008). They are associated with a variety of emotions (most
commonly anger and sadness), tend to be vivid and distressing,
and are often accompanied by physical sensations and a sense of
reliving the event (Birrer et al., 2007; Patel et al., 2007; Reynolds
& Brewin, 1999).
Kuyken and Brewin (1994) found that higher intrusion levels
were correlated with indices of more severe abuse and with more
severe depression. Intrusive memories are also positively corre-
lated with numerous aspects of depressive cognition, including
lower self-esteem, a negative attributional style, and dysfunctional
coping (Kuyken & Brewin, 1999); anxious preoccupation, cogni-
tive avoidance, and helplessness/hopelessness (Brewin et al.,
1998a); and difficulty in supplying specific autobiographical mem-
ories to supplied cue words (Kuyken & Brewin, 1995; Raes et al.,
2006).
To test the involvement of intrusions in maintenance, Brewin,
Watson, McCarthy, Hyman, and Dayson (1998b) examined the
ability of baseline measures of intrusive autobiographical memory
to predict anxiety or depression in a sample of depressed cancer
patients at 6 months follow-up, controlling for baseline anxiety or
depression as well as the stage of the illness. The presence of
intrusive memories either at baseline or prior to follow-up made an
additional significant contribution to anxiety but not to depression
at follow-up. Brewin, Reynolds, and Tata (1999) investigated
similar processes in 62 depressed psychiatric patients. Having
high-frequency involuntary intrusive memories at baseline was
significantly predictive of later depression, even when controlling
for the severity of symptoms at baseline.
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
In Hackmann et al.’s (2004) study, patients typically described
the intrusion of between one and four highly repetitive trauma
memories, mainly consisting of sensory experiences of short du-
ration (see also Speckens, Ehlers, Hackmann, Ruths, & Clark,
2007). Consistent with the observations of Ehlers et al. (2002),
only 17% of these corresponded to the worst period of the trauma,
the majority consisting of moments signaling that the traumatic
event was about to happen or that the meaning of the event had
become more threatening. In contrast, Holmes, Grey, and Young
(2005) found that 77% of intrusions could be matched to the
subjectively reported worst moments of the trauma (hotspots).
Differences in methodology between studies means that questions
about the precise timing of intrusion content relative to the trau-
matic event remain unresolved. It is also important to note that, as
with Reynolds and Brewin (1998), Hackmann et al. noted a small
proportion of repetitive intrusions that did not correspond to actual
events. Rather, the intrusions consisted of imagined scenarios that
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event.
One of the earliest studies to provide empirical support for the
observation that in PTSD intrusive memories contain prominent
sensory/perceptual features, are highly emotional, and involve an
intense reliving of the event in the present was that of van der Kolk
and Fisler (1995). They noted that narrative memories of the
traumatic event developed more slowly, with trauma victims ini-
tially struggling to put their experience into words. Reynolds and
Brewin (1999) found additionally that intrusive memories were
most likely to last for a period of minutes, were highly distressing,
and were accompanied by physical sensations. They were associ-
ated with a variety of emotions, most commonly, anger, sadness,
fear, helplessness, and guilt.
Consistent with the evidence for elevated levels of dissociation
in PTSD (Brewin & Patel, in press; Waller, Putnam, & Carlson,
1996), 42% of Reynolds and Brewin’s (1999) PTSD patients
reported that at least one of their intrusions involved an out-of-
body experience in which during the trauma they had had the
sensation of observing themselves from an external perspective.
Similarly, McIsaac and Eich (2004) found that 36% of their PTSD
sample experienced intrusive memories from an external perspec-
tive. In their study this perspective was associated with more
information about spatial relations, self-observations, and periph-
eral details. In contrast, those patients who reported seeing the
event through their own eyes described more emotional reactions,
physiological sensations, and psychological states.
A key issue is the association between intrusive memories and
the course of disorder. Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, and Clark (2005)
showed that there were relatively small differences between trau-
matized samples with and without PTSD in the number of intru-
sive memories individuals reported and the likelihood that these
contained sensory experiences. What did strongly reflect PTSD
severity was increased distress associated with the memories, a
lack of context, and the sense that the memories were being relived
in the present. These intrusion characteristics predicted the severity
of PTSD 6 months later over and above initial diagnostic status.
Hackmann et al. (2004) reported that during therapy the frequency
of intrusions diminished, as did their vividness, the associated
distress, and the sense of how much the events appeared to be
happening again in the present (see also Speckens, Ehlers, Hack-
mann, & Clark, 2006).
Other Anxiety Disorders
Hackmann, Surawy, and Clark (1998) reported that significantly
more socially anxious patients than nonanxious controls experi-
enced an intrusive image when in a stressful social situation. As in
Wells and Hackmann’s (1993) study of health anxiety, Hackmann
et al. (2000) further noted that intrusive images in social phobia
were generally associated (by the patient) with early adverse social
events that clustered in time around the onset of the disorder. They
commented that the image appeared to correspond to the ab-
stracted essence of the memory. For example, in her recurrent
image, one of their participants reported seeing herself lurching
around out of control, vocalizing noises that did not make sense. In
the linked memory she saw herself in the playground at school,
pretending to be a horse, galloping and neighing unconvincingly,
while being mocked by her peers. Another participant recurrently
saw herself as looking stupid with a red face and a closed posture.
In the memory, she reported seeing herself in a classroom being
harshly criticized by a teacher for a stupid answer and looking red
with a closed body posture.
Thus, Hackmann et al. (2000) suggested that in most cases the
central aspect of both the image and the memory was a negative
impression of the observable self, with the memory containing
additional material about the context. Importantly, they noted that
patients had often not made the link between the image and the
corresponding memory and appeared to become aware of it for the
first time during the study. Hackmann et al. (1998) found that,
compared with those of controls, patients’ images were more
negative, often involving them looking embarrassed or humiliated,
and they more often incorporated an external, observer perspective
rather than seeing the situation through their own eyes.
Day et al. (2004) found that all of their agoraphobia sample, but
none of the controls, reported intrusive images. These images were
often linked to an autobiographical memory from childhood in-
volving being victimized or being in danger. Seventy-five percent
of the patients stated that they had not been anxious in
agoraphobic-type situations before experiencing the event that
occurred in their memory. Patients were most likely to report
images that alternated between a field perspective and an observer
perspective.
As documented by de Silva (1986), there are many clinical
accounts of imagery accompanying OCD. In one of the few
systematic studies, Speckens, Hackmann, et al. (2007) found vivid
and distressing recurrent images in 78% of their inpatient sample.
Many patients spontaneously reported initiating rituals when they
became aware of the image. Images often corresponded to, or were
related to, memories of earlier adverse events. These events tended
to immediately precede the onset of or an exacerbation of OCD
symptoms. Lipton, Brewin, Linke, and Halperin (2008) compared
intrusive images in OCD patients with a control sample of patients
suffering from other anxiety disorders. OCD intrusions were more
likely to contain ideas of unacceptable harm and of a dangerous
self. The majority of OCD intrusions were seen from a field rather
than an observer perspective. Lipton et al. (2008) found that OCD
patients reported more frequent intrusive images, as well as a
lesser degree of similarity between their images and corresponding
memories of earlier events.
Eating and Body Perception Disorders
Cooper, Todd, and Wells (1998) found that just over half of a
sample of patients with anorexia or bulimia described intrusive
images that came to mind when they thought about eating or
weight issues. Somerville et al. (2007) noted that their participants
with bulimia reported more spontaneous images than did nondiet-
ing control participants. One participant reported: “I see myself as
if in a photo. I’m wearing baggy clothes. I’m spotty with greasy
hair. I’m two stone overweight. Fat stomach, fat thighs, double
chin. I’m eating a chocolate bar. My clothes feel tight. I’m hot,
sweaty, sticky. My stomach feels full, uncomfortable, nauseous.
My mouth tastes sour and horrible, cloying after eating lots of
sweet things. I can smell the sweat from my own body.” A number
of images were linked to a specific childhood memory that was
similar in emotional and sensory characteristics.
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limia were recurrent and significantly more negative and anxiety-
provoking than were those of controls. Patients’ images involved
more sensory modalities than did dieting controls’ images and
were more vivid than were nondieting controls’ images. Once
depression was controlled, however, many of the between-groups
differences became nonsignificant.
Intrusive images related to a person’s appearance are signifi-
cantly more common in individuals with body dysmorphic disor-
der than in nonpatient controls (Osman et al., 2004). Images were
more often linked to early memories in the patient sample, and the
median age of this memory was 11.5 years. Typically the memo-
ries concerned being teased or bullied or feeling self-conscious
about the patient’s appearance in adolescence. Recurrent images
were significantly more vivid and detailed in the patient sample
and were more often accompanied by bodily sensations. All pa-
tients saw their images from an observer perspective, whereas all
nonpatients saw their images as though they were looking at
themselves in a mirror.
Psychotic Disorders
Thirty-five patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia were
asked by Morrison et al. (2002) about the occurrence of images
associated with their hallucinations and delusions. Just over half
reported recurrent images. Common themes included images about
feared catastrophes associated with paranoia, traumatic memories,
and images about the perceived source or content of voices.
Images were associated with a variety of emotions, of which the
most common was fear.
Consistent with an experimental study by Mansell and Lam
(2004), Tzemou and Birchwood’s (2007) study found that just
under half of samples of unipolar depressed and bipolar patients
reported distressing intrusive memories. There were no differences
in the prevalence of intrusions between the groups, and no mem-
bers of a control sample reported this phenomenon. Gregory,
Brewin, Mansell, and Donaldson (2008) interviewed 29 bipolar
patients in remission concerning their experience of intrusive
visual memories and other images when in a depressed, a euthy-
mic, and a hypomanic state. Their main finding was that intrusive
memories were more common in euthymic and depressed states,
whereas other images were more common in depressed and hypo-
manic states. Compared with intrusive memories in the euthymic
state, intrusive memories in depression were more distressing and
more vivid and involved more reliving the experience. During
hypomania the intrusive images were as vivid as those the person
experienced when depressed but were rated as much less distress-
ing. On the contrary, most were highly positive.
Summary
Intrusive images and memories appear to be a common feature
of many disparate psychological conditions. Where the data have
been collected, it is generally found that there are a relatively small
number of recurrent intrusions, rarely exceeding six per person and
more often ranging between one and three per person. Memories
tend to be linked in thematic groups, and intrusive images are
frequently associated with specific adverse events in ways that
often come as a surprise to patients when their attention is directed
to it (Holmes & Hackmann, 2004). Recurrent intrusions also occur
in healthy controls, but they are significantly less common, and
when they do occur they are less frequent and less distressing.
One of the most obvious ways in which intrusions differ be-
tween disorders is in their theme (e.g., Lipton et al., 2008; Reyn-
olds & Brewin, 1999). By and large, the content of these intrusions
matches the specific content of verbal thoughts associated with
each disorder. Thus, in panic and agoraphobia, intrusions center
around physical and mental catastrophe; in depression and bipolar
disorder, around negative life events including interpersonal prob-
lems; in health-related anxiety, around illness and death; in social
phobia, around public failure and humiliation; and so on.
Table 1 indicates that in certain disorders, particularly the anx-
iety disorders, images involving dreaded future situations or out-
comes have usually been studied, whereas in depression and PTSD
visual memories of painful or traumatic events have been the main
focus. It is premature, however, to conclude that memory- and
fantasy-based images can be unambiguously distinguished or are
more important in some disorders than others. For example, intru-
sive images concerning the future have been recorded in depres-
sion, PTSD, and the hypomanic phase of bipolar disorder (Gregory
et al., 2008; Holmes et al., 2007; Patel et al., 2007; Reynolds &
Brewin, 1998), although they were generally found to be less
common. In many studies of intrusive imagery, no attempt was
made to report which images corresponded exactly to autobio-
graphical memories, and it was frequently found that fantasy-based
images nevertheless contained memory-related material. Thus, the
relation between images and memories in these clinical conditions
remains one in which a great deal more research is needed.
Despite most studies’ reporting the existence of strongly nega-
tive intrusions, positive images appear to feature in the hypomanic
phase of bipolar disorder (Gregory et al., 2008). Similarly, the
elaborated intrusion model of craving (May, Andrade, Panabokke,
& Kavanagh, 2004) proposes that when reminded about their
desires for substances such as tobacco, certain people create im-
ages that are pleasurable in the short-term but exacerbate their
sense of deficit and bring about a vicious circle of desire, positive
imagery, and planning to fulfill that desire. Mental images, rather
than verbal thoughts, of the substance or the context of its con-
sumption create the strongest positive emotions of reward and
relief. Consistent with this, May et al. (2004) reported data linking
individual craving episodes with positive substance-related imag-
ery.
It is striking that virtually all studies describe these recurrent
intrusions as being vivid, detailed, and accompanied by (often
extremely strong) physical sensations and emotions. Across disor-
ders the visual modality is almost invariably the most common, but
it is clear that sound, taste, and smell are also frequently involved.
Among the differences found are that in patients with PTSD,
compared with those with depression, the intrusions are associated
with greater helplessness and have more dissociative qualities such
as out-of-body experiences or a sense of reliving the event in the
present (Birrer et al., 2007; Reynolds & Brewin, 1999). Reynolds
and Brewin (1999) conducted an exploratory factor analysis that
suggested, consistent with this, that feeling helpless during an
intrusive memory was associated with dissociation, whereas feel-
ing fear was related to reliving the event in the present. A more
recent study has confirmed that levels of dissociation are much
higher in PTSD than in depression (Brewin & Patel, in press).
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that these intrusions are closely related to other aspects of disor-
ders, including their course. Thus, intrusions and/or their charac-
teristics have been found to be related to coping and other negative
cognitions in depression and OCD; to outcome in cancer-related
anxiety, depression, and PTSD; and to overgeneral memory recall
in depression. Observations in samples with depression, PTSD,
agoraphobia, social anxiety, and OCD are strongly suggestive that
the events figuring in these memories were associated with either
the onset or an exacerbation of the disorder. Hirsch, Clark,
Mathews, and Williams (2003) provided further evidence for the
functional role of imagery by experimentally manipulating the
images that social phobia patients held in mind when interacting in
a social situation. Holding a negative rather than a neutral image in
mind led to greater anxiety and more negative interpretations of
performance.
The review has also identified many areas in need of further
research. For example, in PTSD, flashbacks are sometimes de-
scribed as like video clips (Ehlers & Steil, 1995; Hackmann et al.,
2004), implying that they consist of temporally extended events.
However, the exact nature of how the scenes and incidents are
chained together, and whether this is similar to that found in other
temporally extended memories, has not been studied. Similarly,
the subjective report of the same memories recurring repeatedly
has not been subject to empirical verification, and it is unclear
whether these phenomena occur as exact or approximate repeti-
tions. Finally, research is needed into why memories appear to
occur more frequently from an observer viewpoint in some disor-
ders than in others.
Psychology and Neuroscience of Memory and Imagery
Memory
Involuntary memory. Intrusive memories combine two areas
of research in cognitive psychology: involuntary memory and
autobiographical memory. The study of involuntary memory, al-
though minimal compared with that of voluntary memory, has a
long history in psychology, stretching back at least as far as
Ebbinghaus (Berntsen, 2009). It is generally seen as an associative
process, in which the cue alone is sufficient to prompt retrieval, in
contrast to the strategic, deliberative nature of voluntary recall. A
number of researchers have proposed that involuntary retrieval
results in memory contents remaining more consistent over time,
as the alterations introduced by deliberate search and reconstruc-
tion are absent (e.g., Estes, 1997).
Differences between voluntary and involuntary recall were re-
viewed by Berntsen (2007). Compared with the former, the latter
were more likely to involve specific episodes, to influence mood,
and to come with an accompanying bodily reaction. Involuntary
memories have also been found to be retrieved more quickly and
to be more likely following negative cues (Schlagman & Kvavi-
lashvili, 2008). Studies comparing different types of recall for the
same experimental material have generally found that the accuracy
of voluntary recall is unrelated to the frequency of involuntary
intrusions (Brewin & Saunders, 2001; Holmes, Brewin, & Hen-
nessy, 2004).
Moscovitch (1995) proposed that associative (involuntary) re-
trieval has its neural basis in the functioning of the hippocampus
and surrounding medial temporal cortex, which reinstate a previ-
ous conscious experience by activating a network of areas in-
volved in the original perception of the event. Voluntary retrieval,
by contrast, depends on the instigation of an appropriate strategy
through activity in the prefrontal cortex, which then, if successful,
also produces MTL activation. Subsequent research has indicated
that, of the temporoparietal and prefrontal networks identified with
episodic memory, the more medial structures such as the hip-
pocampus, the retrosplenial cortex, the precuneus, and the ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex appear to support memory for the context
of episodic events (Burgess, Maguire, Spiers, & O’Keefe, 2001)
and can be activated by both voluntary and involuntary recall
(Hall, Gjedde, & Kupers, 2008). By contrast, activation of more
lateral and anterior prefrontal areas appears to reflect top-down
modulation by variables such as effort, deliberate choice of strat-
egy, and postretrieval processing in dealing with, for example,
interference between multiple potentially relevant memories (e.g.,
Fletcher & Henson, 2001; Hall et al., 2008; King, Hartley, Spiers,
Maguire, & Burgess, 2005).
Autobiographical memory. Traditionally, autobiographical
memory and episodic memory have been treated as virtually inter-
changeable terms for a single memory system, with autobiograph-
ical memory referring to the specific subset of knowledge relating
to the self and its personal history (Baddeley, 2001). From the time
of Janet (1904), however, many of those studying the recall of
highly emotional events have proposed the existence of an image-
based memory system that captures sensory and perceptual details
of significant scenes and is distinct from a verbally based narrative
memory system. This image-based system is believed to be ac-
cessed involuntarily and to support the recollective experience
revealed by flashbulb memories (Brown & Kulik, 1977) and the
spontaneous switching into the present tense when recounting an
emotional narrative (Pillemer, 1998; Pillemer & White, 1989). A
perceptual memory system supporting conscious experience was
also part of the more general memory framework proposed by
Johnson (1983).
Drawing on these theories, Brewin, Dalgleish, and Joseph
(1996) put forward a dual representation theory of PTSD, in which
the traumatic event was represented in two parallel memory sys-
tems. The situationally accessible memory (SAM) system contains
detailed sensory and perceptual images that can be accessed only
involuntarily and that form the basis for flashbacks and nightmares
relating to the traumatic moments themselves. This system is
thought to be supported primarily by subcortical structures and by
areas of the brain directly involved in perception rather than in
higher order cognitive control. The lack of involvement of struc-
tures such as the hippocampus results in a memory that is not
contextualized but experienced as happening again in the present.
The verbally accessible memory (VAM) system contains records
of conscious experience that can be either automatically or delib-
erately retrieved and that support communication, reappraisal, and
consequent alteration of life goals. This system requires the ability
to flexibly access and manipulate a variety of information, can
situate such information in its appropriate spatial and temporal
context, and is assumed to depend on prefrontal areas of the brain
as well as MTL structures such as the hippocampus (Brewin,
2001). Both systems are conceived of as part of normal memory
but as functioning abnormally in PTSD.
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episodic and autobiographical memory systems. The episodic sys-
tem retains highly detailed sensory and perceptual knowledge over
relatively brief retention intervals (measured in minutes and
hours). It is an image-based system possessing little if any con-
ceptual organization and is located in posterior temporo-occipital
areas. Retrieval is involuntary (i.e., associative) rather than gener-
ative (i.e., strategic) and corresponds to a recollective experience
or reliving. Retention of this episodic information usually depends
on its integration within autobiographical memory, a knowledge-
based, conceptually organized system located in prefrontal
anterior-temporal areas that can be accessed either automatically
or strategically. Autobiographical memories are given their context
by the individual’s personal history but are associated with recol-
lection only to the extent that they are linked with episodic mem-
ories.
Conway’s (2001, 2005) formulation of episodic memory is
similar to the episodic buffer proposed by a number of theorists,
including Baddeley (2000) and Kosslyn, Thompson, and Ganis
(2006). Its context is the immediate past and egocentric orientation
of the individual perceiver. A similar distinction between a short-
term episodic memory and a long-term autobiographical memory
system forms part of a computational model of consciousness
described by Baars, Ramamurthy, and Franklin (2007). More
recently, however, Conway (2009) put forward evidence that ep-
isodic memory is not restricted to short-term storage and that its
contents, even though relatively inaccessible without the necessary
retrieval cues, may even be permanent. He further proposed that
PTSD may be characterized by the intrusion into consciousness of
episodic elements that are lacking a frame of conceptual, contex-
tualizing knowledge.
Neuroscience of Fearful Memories
Finally, recent advances in the neuroscience of fearful memo-
ries—specifically the acquisition and reconsolidation of involun-
tary responses—appear poised to become relevant to the clinical
disorders reviewed earlier. Although our main focus here concerns
conscious imagery, the neural mechanisms of involuntary fearful
responses are relevant to the revised dual representation model
introduced later and also offer the future prospect of alternative
therapies to those reviewed here. Put briefly, acquisition of the
association between a (visual or auditory) sensory stimulus and an
electric shock leads to subsequent involuntary fearful responses to
the stimulus, such as freezing in rodents (LeDoux, 1996) or fear-
potentiated startle in humans (e.g., Kindt, Soeter, & Vervliet,
2009). These changes depend on molecular processes in the baso-
lateral amygdala (e.g., Monfils, Cowansage, Klann, & LeDoux,
2009) that effectively route low-level (subcortical) sensory repre-
sentations to internal representations of emotional state, most
likely supported by the insula (e.g., Craig, 2002). These findings
relate to the low-level sensation-bound representations considered
later in the section titled A Neurocognitive Model of Healthy
Memory and Imagery. Of relevance to the alternative contextually
bound representations considered later in the same section, the
expression of these fearful responses is modulated by the hip-
pocampus so that they occur only when the subject is within the
same physical context in which the shock was experienced (Kim &
Fanselow, 1992).
Reactivation of the initial memory, by a single presentation of
the stimulus, renders its association to fearful responses vulnerable
to disruption by pharmacological (Kindt et al., 2009; Nader,
Schafe, & LeDoux, 2000) or behavioral (Monfils et al., 2009)
intervention. Interestingly, this manipulation has no effect on the
conscious recollection of the training events (Kindt et al., 2009),
which is thought to depend on the hippocampus. One possibility is
that the reactivated memory requires reconsolidation and that if
this process is disrupted, then the learned association is lost. If
correct, this potentially offers an alternative to the learning of a
new positive or null association for the stimulus that then competes
with the existing negative association (as in extinction training).
Reconsolidation offers a theoretical advantage over extinction,
following which the older negative association can recur sponta-
neously or after reexposure to the shock (e.g., Monfils et al., 2009).
Images
The clinical studies reviewed previously have demonstrated a
close correspondence between intrusive images of dreaded future
outcomes and intrusive memories of past upsetting or dangerous
events. Apart from the similarities in content, both are described in
terms of being vivid, persistent, hard to control, and accompanied
by strong emotional reactions. This is consistent with an increased
recent focus on the importance of future simulation. For example,
Barsalou (2003) proposed that a primary function of the cognitive
system is to run a series of simulations of future events so as to
equip the individual to make better informed behavioral choices.
Similarly, in their constructive episodic simulation hypothesis,
Schacter, Addis, and Buckner (2007) proposed that future simu-
lation is facilitated by having a memory system that can flexibly
draw upon and recombine details of past events. This system, they
suggested, may be involved in a range of tasks requiring mental
simulation of alternative perspectives, including alternative per-
spectives on the present.
The core temporoparietal network for context retrieval has been
associated with the related processes of the generation of imagery
(Burgess, Becker, et al., 2001; Byrne et al., 2007; Hassabis,
Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; Schacter et al., 2007) and
associative encoding (Peters, Daum, Gizewski, Forsting, &
Suchan, 2009). Byrne et al. (2007), Kosslyn et al. (2006), and
Schacter et al. (2007) have gone further in suggesting that the
neural machinery for experiencing the past and imagining the
future is similar if not identical. Schacter et al. (2007) proposed a
core brain system mediating past and future thinking, consisting
predominantly of medial prefrontal regions, posterior regions in
the medial and lateral parietal cortices, the lateral temporal cortex,
and the MTL (including the hippocampus). They suggested that
this system integrates information from past experiences and uses
it to construct mental simulations about possible future events.
Given the clinical evidence for taking alternative perspectives
when visualizing images and memories, it is of considerable in-
terest that there are thought to be a number of parallel neural
systems that can represent objects and spatial information in dif-
ferent ways. For example, Marsolek (1999) presented evidence
that object information is processed by one neural system, more
prominent in the right hemisphere, that captures viewpoint-
dependent information about the specific object exemplar pre-
sented on one occasion. He contrasted this type of episodic mem-
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that processes an abstract structural description of the object in-
fluenced by past exemplars.
Hitch, Brandimonte, and Walker (1995); Kosslyn et al. (2006);
Schacter, Cooper, and Delaney (1990); and Stankiewicz, Hummel,
and Cooper (1998) have all distinguished object representations
consisting of abstract structural descriptions from representations
depicting the spatial relations between object and perceiver as
experienced in a particular episode. Kosslyn et al. (2006) proposed
the existence of a visual buffer that contains more information
from an episode than can be processed in detail. An attention
window selects some of the information in the buffer for further
processing. Information in the attention window is sent to an
object-properties processing system in the inferior temporal lobe,
where an abstract structural description is created on the basis of
features such as shape and color and is compared with previously
stored representations. In contrast, information from the entire
visual field, not just the attention window, is sent to a spatial-
properties processing system located in the parietal lobe. Within
this system, object maps are topographically organized and depict
objects or scenes relative to the perceiver.
Burgess, Becker, et al. (2001) and Byrne et al. (2007) proposed
a related computational model in which spatial information de-
rived from either perception or imagery is represented in memory
in both a less flexible egocentric form (viewpoint-dependent in-
formation stored relative to the body) and a more flexible allocen-
tric form (viewpoint-independent information stored relative to the
environment and able to be manipulated in novel ways). In this
model, egocentric representations are supported by the precuneus,
a medial parietal structure generally considered to play an impor-
tant role in imagery and autobiographical memory (e.g., Burgess,
Becker, et al., 2001; Fletcher et al., 1995; Schacter et al., 2007).
These egocentric representations form the basis of short-term
spatial memory and imagery and can be modulated by directed
attention in the form of planned eye movements (e.g., Wallentin,
Roepstorff, & Burgess, 2008). Lateral parietal areas also partici-
pate in the storage aspects of spatial working memory, with pre-
frontal areas contributing to control aspects, such as planning or
active maintenance.
Byrne et al. (2007) proposed that, whereas the parietal repre-
sentation system is important for immediate action, long-term
memory storage is facilitated by allocentric representations pro-
duced by activity in the hippocampus and surrounding MTL struc-
tures (see also Milner, Dijkerman, & Carey, 1999). These MTL
representations are not dependent on a specific viewpoint and can
be more flexibly accessed. Normal encoding and retrieval require
communication between the parietal and MTL areas, accomplished
by pathways that involve the posterior parietal and retrosplenial
cortices, including a translation process that integrates these two
sets of representations. As well as representing immediate sensory
inputs, therefore, the precuneus provides an arena to which stored
allocentric representations in long-term memory can be transferred
and in which they can be recreated, inspected, and manipulated.
Summary: Dual Representations in Memory
It has been proposed that voluntary and involuntary memory
depend on similar networks in the brain, with voluntary memory
additionally recruiting prefrontal areas as part of the strategic
search process. Both memory and imagery appear to rely on
common networks involving medial prefrontal regions, posterior
regions in the medial and lateral parietal cortices, the lateral
temporal cortex, and the MTL. A common theme running through
the work reviewed in the previous section is the distinction be-
tween representations that capture relatively unprocessed sensory
data and representations that are more abstract. Although the
precise terminology and distinctions differ owing to the varying
phenomena under study, we suggest that there is a core difference
that is common to all theories.
On the one hand there is a memory system that is designed to
code sensations, as far as the brain will allow, in the unique form
in which they were experienced (e.g., egocentric, viewpoint-
dependent, depictive, SAM). Information in this system can be
activated by matching inputs, with cues often consisting of low-
level sensory features. The second system codes what is perceived
in terms of more abstract properties that are common across
experiences (e.g., allocentric, viewpoint-independent, structural,
VAM). These representations can be used to (re)construct images
consistent with the experienced event from any desired viewpoint.
Information in this system can also be combined flexibly to re-
spond to novel situations and, in humans, to support higher cog-
nitive functions such as planning, narration, and communication.
Although not the focus here, the parallels with the dual process
models of recognition memory (e.g., Rugg & Yonelinas, 2003) are
noteworthy.
A Revised Dual Representation Theory of Visual
Intrusions
The dual representation theory of PTSD (Brewin, 2001, 2003;
Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996) was concerned with explain-
ing the nature of intrusive memories in this disorder in terms of
VAMs, SAMs, and their interrelation. Here we present a revised
dual representation theory, taking into account the recent clinical,
neuroscientific, and psychological advances regarding intrusive
memories and images reviewed earlier. The revised model is
concerned with a broader spectrum of visual intrusions occurring
across different disorders and offers considerably greater specific-
ity in describing the underlying neural processes.
The background to the extension described here is provided by
the main features of dual representation theory as it stands, which
we can briefly summarize as follows. The VAM system supports
abstract declarative representations within their associated auto-
biographical context and in a form accessible to deliberate retrieval
and manipulation. The SAM system holds low-level representa-
tions tightly bound to their sensory and affective qualities. In
PTSD, extremely stressful events are stored as SAMs without the
usual association to the VAM system. This allows retrieval of
SAMs to be triggered involuntarily by environmental or internal
(situational) cues reminiscent of the original trauma without re-
trieval of the appropriate autobiographical context.
What function does this loss of association between VAM and
SAM systems serve in PTSD? It has been proposed that the
narrowing of attention brought about by extreme stress, as well as
the loss of hippocampal function, means that less information
about a potentially life-threatening event can be stored in a con-
sciously available form (Brewin, 2003). This reduction in encod-
ing may be increased by peritraumatic reactions such as dissoci-
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2000). Because the information may be critical for future survival,
it is captured in the form of sensory images, allowing maximally
large amounts of data to be processed in parallel and recorded
(although not provided with a spatial or temporal context). Flash-
backs are an adaptive process in which stored information can be
re-presented and processed in greater depth once the danger is past.
PTSD, according to this account, reflects the failure of the re-
presented information to be attended to. Instead, traumatic images
are avoided and never become associated with their proper context.
The VAM system is identified with the hippocampus, whose
function may be modulated by conditions of extreme stress (Met-
calfe & Jacobs, 1998; Pitman, Shalev, & Orr, 2000), whereas
SAMs are associated with sensory and interoceptive cortical areas.
We outline, as the starting point for a revised dual representation
theory, a neurocognitive model of healthy memory and then seek
to define how intrusive memories and images arise within such a
system.
A Neurocognitive Model of Healthy Memory and
Imagery
We first define terms for each of the two types of representation, in
order to avoid the potential confusion arising from the multiple
previous terminologies. Their properties are summarized in Table 2.
Henceforth we refer to abstract, contextually bound representa-
tions as contextual memory (C-memory) and its representations as
C-reps rather than as VAMs. The new terminology acknowledges
that verbal accessibility is not their defining property, although the
ability to deliberately retrieve and manipulate C-reps will certainly
aid in their verbal expression. C-memory could provide the basis
for narrative memory as described by Janet (1904) and Pillemer
(1998). Similarly, we will refer to low-level sensation-based mem-
ory (S-memory) and its corresponding representations (S-reps)
rather than as SAMs. The new terminology acknowledges that they
play a role in healthy memory in addition to being reactivated as
flashbacks in sufferers with PTSD. S-memory is a candidate for
Conway’s (2009) reconceptualized episodic memory system and
could support the image-based memory systems proposed by
Brown and Kulik (1977) and Pillemer (1998).
We assume that C-reps are supported by the classical MTL
system for declarative memory (Scoville & Milner, 1957; Squire &
Zola-Morgan, 1991), including the hippocampal provision of the
spatio-temporal contextual information associated with an episodic
memory for an event (Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993; Kinsbourne &
Wood, 1975; O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978; Tulving, 1983). A more
detailed model of C-reps would involve an initial contextual rep-
resentation that becomes integrated into personal semantic mem-
ory over time, following Marr’s (1970, 1971) model of the rela-
tionship between the hippocampus and the neocortex (see also
McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995). With their associ-
ation to semantic memory, C-reps can also be used to generate
meaningful interpretations of an event, abstracted or “gist” repre-
sentations, and novel images that combine object and conceptual
information in flexible ways, such as images from nonexperienced
viewpoints.
The neural mechanisms underlying the retrieval of relatively
abstract long-term C-reps into short-term visuospatial imagery
have been modeled in some detail (Burgess, Becker, et al., 2001;
Byrne et al., 2007). In these models, the C-reps include the spatial
layout of the scene comprising the event (i.e., its spatial context),
encoded as allocentric representations in the hippocampal and
parahippocampal regions (i.e., the distances of scene elements
north, south, east or west of the person). Retrieval corresponds to
the construction of a short-term egocentric representation for in-
spection or manipulation (i.e., the distances of scene elements to
the left or right of or ahead of the subject). The required process of
translating scene information between egocentric and allocentric
reference frames is assumed to be supported by the retrosplenial
and posterior parietal cortices, with imagery supported in the
precuneus. The need for the imposition of a viewing direction to
produce an egocentric representation potentially explains the in-
volvement of Papez’s circuit in episodic recollection, because this
circuit supports a representation of head direction in rodents (e.g.,
Taube, 1998).
During the encoding of normal episodic memories, temporary
activation of lower level sensory cortices, driven by perception,
allows the initial formation of the higher level representations
described earlier in the parietal and MTL associative cortices.
1 The
same mechanism that translates from egocentric perceptual repre-
sentations to contribute to allocentric MTL representations during
encoding also translates from allocentric long-term memory to
generate egocentric imagery during deliberate retrieval of an event
(see Figures 1a and 1b). For normal events, these low-level sen-
sory representations, or S-reps, will quickly decay and become
relatively inaccessible.
The effects of emotion on memory are well established, if far
from being completely understood (Cahill & McGaugh, 1998;
McGaugh, Roozendaal, & Okuda, 2006). According to dual rep-
resentation theory, perception of a moderately stressful or emo-
tionally salient event results in the creation of more enduring
C-reps and S-reps. Such S-reps would also include autonomic
markers of affective values such as fear or disgust mediated by the
insula (Craig, 2002; Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Öhman, &
Dolan, 2004) that become associated to the low-level sensory
characteristics of the event via the amygdala (LeDoux, 1996). The
S-rep can be reactivated bottom-up by experiencing a similar
perceptual input or top-down via associations from the higher level
representation of the original event (e.g., a reconstructed egocen-
tric image with features and viewpoint similar to those experienced
at encoding) in the precuneus.
In healthy individuals, the S-rep for an extreme event is asso-
ciated, via higher level representations in the precuneus, to a
corresponding C-rep in the MTLs. The association to the corre-
sponding C-rep has two consequences: (a) allowing the event to be
correctly integrated with its semantic and autobiographical con-
text, thereby preventing it from being reexperienced in the present,
and (b) allowing for increased top-down control via connections
from the prefrontal cortex to the MTL, such as the provision of
specific retrieval cues, verification of the products of retrieval (see,
e.g., Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Fletcher & Henson, 2001), strat-
egies for disambiguating events with similar contexts (King et al.,
2005), and deliberate suppression of retrieval if required (Ander-
1 Here we use lower level to indicate more sensory-bound representa-
tions and lower perceptual processing areas, as opposed to more abstract,
less perceptually bound representations and higher association areas.
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evidence for neuroanatomically distinct pathways exerting sepa-
rate top-down control over areas associated with the sensory
aspects of memory (visual cortex, thalamus) and areas associated
with multimodal and emotional aspects (hippocampus, amygdala;
Depue, Curran, & Banich, 2007).
How Do Intrusive Images Arise Within This Model?
According to this revised dual representation theory, many of
the intrusive memories found in clinical disorders such as depres-
sion arise within the normal working of the autobiographical
memory system as instances of involuntary recall producing com-
bined reactivation of corresponding C-reps and S-reps. As such,
intrusive images can arise in two ways. Long-lasting S-reps,
formed by emotionally salient experiences, may be retrieved by
corresponding emotional states or by sensory cues in the external
environment, with this sensory reliving component given a context
and modulated by activation of the corresponding C-reps. Alter-
natively, images in the precuneus formed from C-reps may invol-
untarily activate associated S-reps that contribute additional sen-
sory and emotional aspects to retrieval. For example, a depressed
person might have a negative thought about being rejected that was
associated with a C-rep of a time when he or she was jilted by a
lover. Activation of the C-rep could then trigger the reactivation of
an associated S-rep that would contribute sensory details of the
rejection event, along with associated feelings of anger and de-
spair. Consistent with this, visual memories of upsetting episodes
have been observed to intrude into the verbal ruminations of
depressed individuals (Birrer et al., 2007; Pearson et al., 2008).
As noted by Berntsen (2007), the descriptions given by many
patients of their intrusions tend to involve specific episodes and
emphasize reexperiencing, the impact on their mood, and the
associated bodily reactions. Although there is no particular reason
to think this process has a different neural basis from the invol-
untary memories of a nonclinical sample (cf. Berntsen & Rubin,
2008), an explanation is required for why intrusions are so much
more frequent and distressing in clinical groups. Likely candidates
are the processes of selective attention (patients attend to specific
features of the environment that trigger negative memories), neg-
ative appraisals (they interpret events in a way that increases
negative mood and the likelihood of recalling related negative
events), cognitive and behavioral avoidance (they monitor the
environment for negative reminders in a way that unintentionally
prolongs the salience of negative memories), and distorted reason-
ing (they overgeneralize from other negative events or take exces-
sive responsibility for them, thereby creating associative links to
negative events in the past). All these processes have been iden-
tified as present across many different disorders (A. G. Harvey et
al., 2004).
As part of the process of deliberately simulating possible future
outcomes, some individuals will construct images (e.g., of worst
possible scenarios) based on information in C-memory and gen-
erate images in the precuneus. These images may be influenced by
related information held in C-memory or in addition the images
may be altered by the involuntary retrieval of related material from
S-memory. Novel images may also arise spontaneously in
S-memory through processes of association. If sufficiently emo-
tional, these internally generated images will, like externally gen-
erated images, bring about long-lasting S-reps. As a result, inter-
nally generated images may come to behave much like intrusive
memories, being automatically triggered and accompanied by a
strong sense of reliving.
Images deliberately created from long-term memory will have
corresponding C-reps that provide an anchoring context, whereas
spontaneous images arising from S-reps may not. In this case,
some patients may have difficulty in retrieving any autobiograph-
ical events that form the basis of their images, as described by
Holmes and Hackmann (2004). In other respects, nonveridical
spontaneous images will tend to behave in the same way as those
closely reflecting actual experience. Indeed, in some cases con-
fabulatory memories may be confused with actual experiences, as
in the case of perceived alien abduction (McNally et al., 2004).
Intrusive Images in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
As we have seen, there is evidence that there are systematic
differences between some intrusive memories characteristic of
depression and those occurring in PTSD, with PTSD flashbacks
being retrievable only involuntarily and involving reliving the
event as though it were occurring in the present. To our knowledge
the more extreme forms of reexperiencing observed in some PTSD
patients have never been described in someone with a primary
diagnosis of depression or of another anxiety disorder. In previous
articles it was proposed that this was because (a) details of the
traumatic event were initially encoded better into the SAM than
into the VAM system and (b) some trauma-related information
remained isolated in the SAM system and was not copied into the
hippocampally dependent VAM system, where it could be pro-
vided with a spatial and temporal context (Brewin, 2001). This
transfer process was assumed to require deliberate attention being
paid to the content of flashbacks.
The idea that extreme stress may have different effects on
different memory systems is not new. There is accumulating
Table 2
Characteristics of Contextual and Sensation-Based Memory
Variable Contextual memory (C-memory) Sensation-based memory (S-memory)
Related terms Allocentric, viewpoint-independent, structural, abstract,
verbally accessible
Egocentric, viewpoint-dependent, depictive, situationally
accessible
Access Voluntary or involuntary Involuntary, via matching inputs
Supports Integration with previous knowledge, simulation,
communication
Immediate action, autonomic responses
Scope Attentional window Entire visual field
Visual processing stream Ventral Dorsal
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hippocampal functioning while simultaneously potentiating amyg-
dala functioning (Elzinga & Bremner, 2002; Metcalfe & Jacobs,
1998; Payne et al., 2006; Vyas, Mitra, Rao, & Chattarji, 2002).
Theoretically, this should produce strong S-reps but weaker or
impoverished C-reps.
In the revised dual representation model, we suggest accord-
ingly that flashbacks in PTSD result from the creation of an S-rep
without the usual association to a corresponding C-rep. The con-
trast between normal and pathological encoding of a traumatic
event is summarized in Figures 1a and 1b. Normal encoding
involves the creation of C-reps and S-reps with connections be-
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Figure 1. A schematic model of memory encoding, showing the approximate regions and pathways involved
in, and the areas supporting, abstracted contextual representations (C-reps, in green) and sensory-bound
representations (S-reps, in red). a: Normal encoding of a traumatic event. b: Pathological encoding of a traumatic
event, showing up-regulation of S-reps, down-regulation of C-reps, and disconnection between S-reps and
C-reps. Heavy lines indicate stronger representations and pathways; dashed lines, weaker representations and
pathways. Note the necessarily schematic style (e.g., many pathways and regions are omitted, and Hippocampus
refers to the extended hippocampal formation and its subcortical connections).
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S-reps, relatively weaker C-reps, and impaired connections be-
tween them.
The desired contextual representation is not primarily defined
by being verbal (although it would support conscious manipulation
and generation of verbal descriptions more easily than would an
S-rep) but by its properties being coded within the ventral stream
in a way that permits integration with other autobiographical
memories.
When such an S-rep is automatically reactivated bottom-up or
top-down, it is vividly reexperienced in the present. The contrast
between normal and pathological retrieval of a traumatic event is
summarized in Figures 2a and 2b. Normal visual recall is driven
top-down by C-reps, with the generation of egocentric visual
imagery allowing reactivation of matching information contained
in S-reps. Flashbacks involve visual imagery being driven
bottom-up by S-reps, relatively uninfluenced by corresponding
C-reps. This reactivation is more like perception than the retrieval
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Figure 2. A schematic model of the generation of memory-related imagery, showing the approximate regions
and pathways involved in, and the areas supporting, abstracted contextual representations (C-reps, in green) and
sensory-bound representations (S-reps, in red). a: Deliberate visual recall. Visual imagery is driven top-down by
C-reps, under the direction of the prefrontal cortex. Reactivation of S-reps is weak and depends on attention to
matching details in imagery. b: Involuntary flashback of a traumatic event. Visual imagery is driven bottom-up
by S-reps triggered by a situational cue and unaffected by weakly activated C-reps. Heavy lines indicate stronger
representations and pathways; dashed lines, weaker representations and pathways. Note the necessarily sche-
matic style (e.g., many pathways and regions are omitted, and Hippocampus refers to the extended hippocampal
formation and its subcortical connections).
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the encoding context or associated autobiographical knowledge.
Note that the absence of a C-rep (as, for example, in amnesia
caused by MTL damage) is not sufficient on its own to cause
flashbacks but only in the context of an enduring S-rep caused by
an extreme event.
Thus, dual representation theory proposes two conditions for the
occurrence of flashbacks: the creation of an enduring S-rep by an
extremely emotional or stressful event, combined with an absence
of integration with a corresponding C-rep, and thus a lack of
appropriate contextualization or top-down control for this S-rep. If
flashbacks are to persist, there must be mechanisms that perpetuate
this lack of integration. PTSD sufferers show marked behavioral
and cognitive avoidance and find their intrusions (or certain parts
of them) too unpleasant to attend to, which could plausibly account
for the fact that the corresponding C-rep remains incomplete. We
propose that the C-rep is rarely completely absent and that it may
be only certain traumatic moments (hotspots) that are missing from
the C-rep. However, extreme reexperiencing, in which all contact
with the current environment is temporarily suspended, would
follow from the complete absence of a C-rep (e.g., because the
S-rep being retrieved was of a childhood experience that had not
been consciously thought about in later life).
Delayed-Onset Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
Many studies have noted that the onset of full PTSD may not
occur until months or years after the corresponding traumatic
event. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(4th ed., text rev.; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) re-
quires a 6-month period to elapse if PTSD is to qualify as delayed-
onset PTSD. On average this occurs in 15.3% of civilian cases of
PTSD and in 38.2% of cases of combat-related PTSD, with initial
PTSD symptoms gradually increasing in number and intensity
(Andrews, Brewin, Philpott, & Stewart, 2007). Delayed-onset
PTSD is associated with gradually increasing levels of arousal and
is often preceded by episodes of depression (Andrews, Brewin,
Stewart, Philpott, & Hejdenberg, 2009).
Following Becker and Wojtowicz (2007), it may be that condi-
tions such as long-term stress or depression impair the ability of
the hippocampus to continue to provide distinct C-reps for trau-
matic events. In combination with low mood and cognitive biases,
trauma memories may trigger further negative reactions, which are
in turn encoded as S-reps. In the absence of distinctive C-reps to
strongly associate negative memories with their past context rather
than current experience, this could produce a downward spiral or
negative feedback loop, eventually creating an enduring S-rep
associated with extreme negative emotion.
One possible mechanism by which the hippocampus could
differentiate the past and present context of reexperiencing trauma
is by association to a continually changing population of new,
easily excitable, neurons in dentate gyrus, created by a process of
neurogenesis (Aimone, Wiles, & Gage, 2006). One of the conse-
quences of depression is a down-regulation of neurogenesis
(Becker & Wojtowicz, 2007), which might lead to prolonged
difficulties in establishing a clear temporal context. Thus, the
ability of the hippocampus to contextualize trauma memories may
change over time. Although this account is necessarily speculative,
it is consistent with observations that late-life PTSD onset appears
frequently to be related to the start of neurodegeneration (Hiskey,
Luckie, Davies, & Brewin, 2008).
Field and Observer Memories
The naturalistic studies reviewed earlier have shown that recur-
rent intrusions involve memories that may be perceived from a
field (i.e., first-person perspective) or an observer perspective. In
these studies, field memories would correspond to egocentric
representations in the precuneus generated bottom-up by specific
S-reps, being more recent, more strongly associated with emotion,
and from an experienced viewpoint. By contrast, observer mem-
ories would correspond to egocentric representations in the precu-
neus generated top-down from C-reps, in that they require gener-
ation of an image from a nonexperienced viewpoint and relate to
older and more abstracted information (see also Conway, 2009).
However, as noted by Nigro and Neisser (1983), some observer
memories may correspond to the person’s perception at the time
(i.e., they may reflect observer experiences, in which the observer
perspective was present during the event, elicited by factors such
as acute self-consciousness).
The suggestion that the observer perspective can be employed
strategically to reduce emotion (e.g., McIsaac & Eich, 2004; Nigro
& Neisser, 1983) fits well with a long history of clinical observa-
tions and theory concerning the role of dissociative reactions such
as out-of-body experiences in protecting some individuals from the
short-term emotional impact of extreme stress. In terms of the
revised model, individuals can be seen as bringing online a scene
that is constructed from information in C-memory. Compared with
the corresponding S-rep, this will have preferential access to
contextual information stored in the MTL and to MTL structures
like the hippocampus—explaining the association of these struc-
tures with the reduction of fear (Douglas, 1972; McCormick &
Thompson, 1982).
Under the revised model, the generation of imagery in the
precuneus from an observer perspective may occur either during
the stressful event itself or subsequently, via a stored C-rep. The
observer perspective makes these images less likely to lead to the
retrieval of corresponding S-reps, because these low-level sensory
representations would not match the observer viewpoint. Findings
suggest this is a mechanism particularly associated with PTSD
(McIsaac & Eich, 2004; Reynolds & Brewin, 1999), social phobia
(Hackmann et al., 2000, 1998), and body dysmorphic disorder
(Osman et al., 2004). Strikingly, 89% of McIsaac and Eich’s
(2004) sample who adopted the observer vantage point said they
did so to spare themselves the horror of having to relive the trauma
again through their own eyes. Similarly, Williams and Moulds
(2007) found that, in a high dysphoric sample, seeing an intrusive
memory from an observer perspective was associated with feeling
more detached and numb.
Summary
The conceptual basis of the dual representation theory of PTSD,
which was inspired largely by clinical observation, has been re-
vised to anchor it more firmly in cognitive neuroscience. Thus, in
terms of visual imagery, we have identified the flexible, con-
sciously accessible, allocentric, context-dependent representations
(C-reps) with the projection of the ventral visual stream to the
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tures such as the hippocampus and parahippocampus. We have
identified the inflexible, sensation-bound, viewpoint-dependent,
involuntarily reactivated representations accompanied by strong
emotional and autonomic components (S-reps) with the projection
of the dorsal visual stream to the superior parietal areas and with
their connections to the amygdala and insula. It is proposed that
these two types of representation can interact via egocentric im-
agery in the precuneus, which could be activated either top-down
or bottom-up by either system, respectively.
We have used the insights afforded by this process to extend its
range to cover intrusions in other disorders as well as to phenom-
ena such as observer memories. There continue to be important
differences, however, between PTSD and other disorders charac-
terized by intrusions. It is only in PTSD, for example, that the
disturbance in memory (or, more accurately, the failure of this
disturbance to be corrected) is seen as a causal factor in the
creation of the disorder as well as a contributor to the maintenance
of the disorder. In other disorders, in which no corresponding
dissociation between memory systems is implicated, the distur-
bance is viewed as contributing much more to maintenance than to
onset. In depression or eating disorders, for example, intrusions
may reflect the effects of high levels of emotion on the entire
memory system rather than any qualitative alteration in the way
the system is operating.
Pursuing this point further, in our earlier review of naturalistic
studies of intrusions we also identified that intrusive images and
memories were sometimes associated with events that appeared to
occur at the onset of a wide variety of disorders. Humiliating
childhood experiences were sometimes linked with the onset of
social phobia, for instance. It is well established that in disorders
such as PTSD, stress may act more as a primary cause but that in
other disorders, such as schizophrenia, stress acts more as a pro-
voking factor in a person with a suitable predisposition. The focus
on intrusions may help to explain why events that are not in
themselves overwhelmingly stressful can be associated with the
onset of these disorders. According to this account, it is because
certain of these events lead to the creation of vivid memories or
images that are hard to dismiss and continue to exert an influence
on subsequent mood regulation.
Although the revised model points to the common neural un-
derpinning of memory and imagery, in the future researchers need
to explore whether past memories of adversity and dreaded images
of future adversity share the same functions. Researchers could
also profitably address the origin of distortions introduced into the
representation of past events as they are projected into the future.
Implications for Psychological Treatment
The finding that intrusive images derived, to a greater or lesser
degree, from autobiographical events are common across a wide
variety of disorders is consistent with the claims of many social
psychologists (e.g., Srull & Wyer, 1990, 1993) that knowledge
about the self does not exist just in a generalized, semantic form
(cf. trait knowledge about the worthlessness or unlovability of the
self; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) but in the form of
episodic memories of specific events. Such events (e.g., a child
being told by a parent that he or she was not wanted) may form
turning points (Pillemer, 1998) that help to define or provide
evidence for the conclusions about the self at which patients may
have arrived.
The data reviewed in this article demonstrate that such events,
and their accompanying emotions, can be repeatedly present in
awareness, providing opportunities to shape appraisal and coping
processes. These memories often have prominent visual compo-
nents that amplify emotional reactions and contribute to the diffi-
culties they cause (Holmes, Geddes, Colom, & Goodwin, 2008).
Moreover, we have presented evidence that these intrusions are
causally related to the course of disorders. Thus, an appreciation of
the importance of these intrusions and of their neural basis will be
important for understanding current therapies as well as suggesting
opportunities for novel forms of therapy.
A general theoretical framework that can suggest suitable inter-
ventions for intrusive images, regardless of their veracity or mo-
dality, is the retrieval competition hypothesis (Brewin, 2006).
Much research in human and animal learning has suggested that
emotions and behavior are under the control of alternative memory
representations that compete for retrieval (Gold, 2004; Jacobs &
Nadel, 1985; Poldrack & Packard, 2003). It is further assumed that
the dominant negative representations that support disordered
mood and behavior cannot be directly altered but that it is possible
to create or strengthen alternative, more positive, representations.
Importantly, these alternative representations do not have to be
more accurate or free of cognitive distortion. Recovery from an
episode of disorder occurs when positive thoughts, memories, and
images are regularly retrieved in preference to negative ones. The
function of the therapist is to produce new positive representations,
or strengthen existing positive representations, so that they are
highly memorable and highly accessible and can compete effec-
tively with previously dominant negative representations.
The role of imagery in psychological therapy has previously
been reviewed in some detail by Hackmann (1998) and Holmes,
Arntz, and Smucker (2007). Here, we focus on the implications of
the revised dual representation theory for understanding two
evidence-based treatments for intrusive memories in PTSD (Na-
tional Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2005)—exposure and eye-
movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR)—and one
relatively understudied treatment, imagery rescripting, that is po-
tentially applicable to many different disorders.
Treatments for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
Exposure. Dual representation theory has previously been
used to provide an explanation for the effectiveness of exposure-
based treatments for PTSD (Brewin, 2001, 2003). It was proposed
that narrowed attention during a traumatic event results in more
detailed perceptual representations being created in the image-
based memory (SAM) system compared with the verbally acces-
sible memory (VAM) system. Exposure to trauma cues, particu-
larly sensory cues, is therefore more likely to result in the SAM
winning the retrieval competition. The fact that the SAM is not
contextualized leads to the brain responding as though the trauma
is in fact happening again in the present, producing a powerful
sense of reliving as well as intense emotional reactions. Normal
recovery depends on holding intrusive images automatically re-
trieved from the SAM in focal attention for sufficient time so that
the details they contain are copied into the VAM, where they are
provided with an autobiographical context. This process is inter-
226 BREWIN, GREGORY, LIPTON, AND BURGESS
zzzPsgiolePfrprupted in PTSD, for example because of other demands on atten-
tion, such as anxiety about the health of self and loved ones, or
altered states such as shock.
The revised theory is more specific about a common neural
basis for these processes, proposing that the contents of the SAM
correspond to long-lasting sensory representations in parieto-
occipital networks that have no counterpart in the contextual
representations stored in MTL structures. The effects of exposure
treatment are now related to two underlying processes. First,
holding images in focal attention in the precuneus facilitates the
transfer of successive parts of S-reps into more elaborated C-reps
that can be integrated with existing autobiographical information.
Second, it facilitates the association of these representations with
one another by means of a pathway via the posterior parietal and
retrosplenial cortices. In this way, the expression of S-reps can
benefit from the contextualization provided by the hippocampus
whereas C-reps can benefit from modification of their associations
to autobiographical and semantic knowledge and from coming
under greater inhibitory control by the prefrontal cortex.
Exposure-based treatments require PTSD patients to give an
extremely detailed oral or written narrative of their traumatic event
and to come into deliberate contact with trauma reminders, for
example by revisiting the scene of the trauma. Some treatments,
such as prolonged exposure (Foa & Rothbaum, 1998), involve
repeating these procedures on numerous occasions until fear di-
minishes. The treatment thus tends to both elicit involuntary trau-
matic images and encourage patients to direct their attention to
them in a systematic way. This is puzzling from the perspective of
a conventional theory of memory, according to which such a
procedure should further consolidate the memory and make the
condition worse. The proposal that there are two sets of memo-
ries—one that primarily acts to excite fear in preparation for action
and one that primarily acts to modulate fear by contextualizing
it—helps to resolve this conundrum.
Eye-movement desensitization and reprocessing. EMDR
(Shapiro, 2001) involves having patients retrieve and hold in focal
attention an image of the worst moment of their trauma, together
with any associated negative thoughts, while the therapist repeat-
edly introduces bilateral stimulation for periods of about 20 s
(called sets). This stimulation may take the form of requiring
patients to track the therapist’s hand with their eyes backward and
forward across the visual field, or of repeated taps on alternate
hands, or of playing sounds that alternate between left and right.
Of these, the most common and empirically validated method is
the visual tracking of the therapist’s hand. During and between
each set, patients are instructed to allow images and thoughts to
enter and leave awareness or change their form, observing them
but not attempting to influence the process.
EMDR is a complex treatment containing elements of exposure
that should facilitate memory contextualization. Another of its
central components involves directing patients to focus attention
on traumatic moments that they may previously have avoided
while simultaneously using a secondary task to reduce the intensity
of the experienced images. We suppose that, while the traumatic
image is being held in the precuneus’s working memory system
(Byrne et al., 2007; Kosslyn et al., 2006), patients can scan and
direct their attention to specific parts of the image via projections
from the frontal eye fields (e.g., Wallentin et al., 2008). Carrying
out a series of eye movements at the request of the therapist will
interfere with this process and use up some of the resources
available for maintaining and elaborating the image. Baddeley and
Andrade (2000) and Postle, Idzikowski, Della Sala, Logie, and
Baddeley (2006) have shown that carrying out eye movements
selectively interferes with the visuospatial sketchpad and reduces
the emotionality and vividness of images.
Thus, eye movements are sufficient but not necessary to inter-
fere with trauma imagery, and the direction of the eye movements
is not critical (see Gunter & Bodner, 2008). We speculate that the
emotion-reducing properties of EMDR are an alternative method
of facilitating the elaboration of C-reps and the mapping of S-reps
and C-reps onto one another. The resulting C-reps will also con-
tain, superimposed on the traumatic image, disambiguating infor-
mation (the therapist’s hand movements) that identify the new
representations with the (safe) present rather than the (dangerous)
past. These memories will now be available for retrieval and may
compete effectively with the original S-reps when the individual
subsequently encounters traumatic reminders.
Imagery Rescripting
Imagery rescripting involves having patients focus on the con-
tents of their intrusive image or memory and vividly construct an
alternative, more positive outcome that they have previously gen-
erated and rehearsed with their therapist (Hackmann, 1998). Com-
mon positive images involve fantasies of overcoming aggressors,
humiliating enemies, being rescued, communicating with the dead,
being comforted, and being treated compassionately. Fantasies
often include impossible elements, such as superhuman feats and
supernatural beings, or impossible transformations of the physical
world (Smucker & Dancu, 2005).
Rescripting can be used to support standard cognitive–
behavioral interventions, such as cognitive challenging of negative
beliefs, or alternatively as a stand-alone intervention. Although
there have been no major randomized controlled trials concerning
rescripting, it has shown promising effects, either alone or in
combination with other interventions, in the treatment of the se-
quelae of child sexual abuse (Smucker, Dancu, Foa, & Niederee,
1995), borderline personality disorder (Arntz & Weertman, 1999),
bulimia (Ohanian, 2002), PTSD (Grunert, Smucker, Weis, &
Rusch, 2003), depression (Brewin et al., 2009), social phobia
(Wild, Hackmann, & Clark, 2008), and a variety of other disorders
(Holmes, Crane, Fennell, & Williams, 2007).
According to the revised dual representation theory, rescripting
involves first retrieving the C-rep corresponding to the intrusive
memory or image, projecting it to the precuneus, and then, while it is
being held in mind, reporting on the content of associated S-reps that
are retrieved in consequence. This ensures that all relevant material in
S-reps have the opportunity to be fully contextualized by association
to a new C-rep. A new and more elaborated C-rep is then constructed
that blends this negative material with novel positive elements. If this
process is successful, the projection of this new C-rep to the precuneus
will lead to the spontaneous retrieval of positive sensations and
emotions from S-memory, thereby helping to consolidate it and make
it more accessible. It may be necessary to try a number of alternative
scenarios before a successful C-rep is found that is sufficiently posi-
tive to neutralize the existing negative emotions as well as being
sufficiently memorable to win the retrieval competition with the
original C-rep.
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Several therapies—including exposure, EMDR, and imagery
rescripting—that focus primarily on images and memories already
exist. We suggest that these therapies can be understood within the
context of the revised model and that the scope for intervention is
potentially much wider than has hitherto been realized. For exam-
ple, techniques aimed at abolishing the influence of negative
images could be adapted to disorders involving craving or to the
hypomanic phase of bipolar disorder, where it appears to be
excessively positive images that are problematic. Therapists could
attempt to rescript these images to incorporate negative elements
that would inhibit inappropriate approach behaviors.
Another area involves inhibiting unwanted intrusions by introduc-
ing competing visuospatial task demands. In the area of food cravings,
there are already experimental studies showing that carrying out
visuospatial tasks reduces the vividness of food-related images and
the intensity of cravings (K. Harvey, Kemps, & Tiggemann, 2005;
Kemps, Tiggemann, & Christianson, 2008). Other research has shown
that the development of intrusive images following exposure to a
traumatic film can be inhibited by visuospatial task demands either at
encoding (Brewin & Saunders, 2001; Holmes et al., 2004) or shortly
thereafter (Holmes, James, Coode-Bate, & Deeprose, 2009). In addi-
tion, potential alternative therapies may develop out of recent ad-
vances in disrupting the reconsolidation of fearful responses (Kindt et
al., 2009; Monfils et al., 2009).
Conclusion
Involuntary memory-related imagery appears to play a more sig-
nificant role than has previously been thought across a wide range of
psychological disorders. It represents a mechanism whereby high-
impact events in a person’s history, whether real or imagined, can
continue to affect thought, emotion, and behavior, both in stressful
situations and in episodes of disorder. This suggests that it should be
given greater prominence as a target of psychological therapy than has
often been the case. This is particularly relevant for disorders such as
depression, for which psychological therapies have to date achieved
only moderate levels of effectiveness (Fava, Ruini, & Belaise, 2007;
Roth & Fonagy, 2004).
Of importance are the many indications that the retrieval of
memories concerning the past and images concerning the future
appear to share the same neural structures. By interpreting the dual
representation theory of PTSD (Brewin, 2001, 2003) within the
framework of a neurobiological model of normal memory and
imagery (Burgess, Becker, et al., 2001; Byrne et al., 2007) we have
outlined some of the neural mechanisms potentially underlying the
observation of involuntary visual intrusions within a range of
clinical disorders.
Among the testable predictions that follow from the model are
that asking patients to describe a trauma they have witnessed or
experienced should be more likely to elicit intrusive images if they
describe it from a field perspective than if they describe it from an
observer perspective. Further, the ability to retrieve information
from a viewpoint other than the perceived one, and to suppress
involuntary field memories, should indicate the greater health of or
greater activity in structures, particularly the hippocampus, asso-
ciated with C-memory (Abrahams, Pickering, Polkey, & Morris,
1997; Holdstock et al., 2000; King, Burgess, Hartley, Vargha-
Khadem, & O’Keefe, 2002). Thus, behavioral or pharmacological
manipulations that lead to an increased likelihood of subsequent
intrusive imagery should also be associated with a specific impair-
ment in C-memory-related functions.
We hope that this approach will allow advances in cognitive
neuroscience to inform a wide spectrum of psychological treat-
ments that are applicable to many different disorders. We are
confident that, by constantly updating and integrating findings
from both neuroscience and clinical psychology, researchers will
reach the realistic goal of creating more sophisticated models with
more possibilities of benefiting clinical practice.
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